The rise in the divorce rate over the past 40 years is one of the fundamental changes in American society. A seemingly ever-increasing number of women and children spend some fraction of their life in single female-headed households, leading many to be concerned about the economic circumstances of these women their and children. Estimating the cause-to-effect relationship between marital dissolution and female economic status is complicated because the same factors that increase marital instability may also affect the economic status and labor market behavior of women. We propose an instrumental variables solution to this problem based on the sex of the firstborn child. This strategy exploits the fact that the sex of the firstborn child is random and the fact that marriages are less likely to survive following the birth of girls as opposed to boys. Our IV results cast doubt on the widely held view that divorce causes large declines in economic status for women. Once the negative selection into divorce is accounted for, our results show that, on average, ever-divorced women live in households with more income per person than never-divorced women. * We thank
Introduction
According to the Center for Disease Control (July, 2002) , 33% of first marriages now end in separation or divorce within 10 years. The rising incidence marital dissolution 1 has received substantial attention among social scientists and policymakers. A large body of research has documented the decline in the economic status for women who experience marital instability (i.e. Hoffman and Duncan 1989 , Burkhauser et al. 1991 , Smock, and Manning and Gupta 1999 .
Moreover, the reduction in economic status associated with divorce tends to be long-lasting, unless women remarry.
Based on these observations some analysts have concluded that marriage is a central determinant of economic status for women and their children, thereby making the case for stronger divorce laws. However, it is uncertain that the negative association between divorce and the economic well-being of women represents a cause-to-effect relationship: The same factors that increase the probability of divorce may also be detrimental to economic and labor market status. Therefore, a credible assessment of the impact of marital instability on the economic status of women requires an exogenous determinant of marital instability.
Several concerns motivate the importance of identifying the causal relationship between divorce and the economic status of women. First, this information will contribute to a better understanding of the underlying causes of gender inequality in the United States. 2 The higher rates of poverty and economic deprivation among single female-headed families further heighten the significance of this question. Second, this has tremendous importance for the analysis of welfare and income-maintenance programs, especially in the current context of welfare reform.
Welfare program recipients are disproportionately composed never-married or divorced mothers.
1 Throughout the paper we use marital instability/disruption/dissolution and divorce interchangeably to identify women who are currently separated or have been divorced at least once. 2 See Fuchs (1988) and Blau (1998) for overviews.
Since program eligibility depends on income and labor market outcomes, such as participation and/or labor supply intensity, a better understanding of the relationship between marital disruption and economic status could help improve the efficiency of these programs. Finally, empirical studies may inform and test the predictions of theoretical models of marital formation and dissolution (Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977, Lundberg and Pollak 1993) .
In this paper we propose an instrumental variables (IV) approach to identify the causal effect of marital disruption on the economic status and labor market outcomes of women. The sex of the first child born during a woman's first marriage is used as an instrument for marital disruption. This exploits the fact that marriages are less likely to survive the birth of daughters than sons (Morgan, Lye and Condran 1988 , Teachman and Schollaert 1989 , and Katzev, Warner and Acock 1994 . 3 Using data from the 1980 Census, we find that the rate of marital dissolution is 4% higher for women whose firstborn child is a girl. Since firstborn sex is essentially random, we can construct a credible instrument for divorce in the population of women with at least one child born during their first marriage. 4 We implement this instrumental variables strategy using data from the 1980 U.S. Census of Population. Cross-sectional OLS comparisons of equivalized (person adjusted) household incomes and poverty rates among ever-and never-divorced women indicate a substantial economic disadvantage for ever-divorced women, as was previously noted. In contrast, using firstborn sex as an exogenous determinant of marital dissolution, we find that divorced women have significantly higher levels equivalized household income. However, the large standard errors of the IV estimates on poverty limit our ability to make a definitive statement about the 3 Lundberg and Rose (2002) similarly find that the birth of a son out of wedlock accelerates the transition into marriage relative to the birth of a girl. 4 Angrist and Evans (1998) use a similar IV strategy to estimate the impact of family size on labor supply for married women. In particular, they use the sex-mix of the first two children as an instrument for subsequent fertility.
causal impact of marital instability on female poverty. Combined, these results suggest that OLS comparisons may overstate the detrimental effect of divorce on the economic status of women.
Based on these findings, we investigate two channels through which divorced women might possibly improve their economic position: Labor market attachment and access to other sources of income. First, our IV results indicate that ever-divorced mothers earn approximately $11,000 (in 2002 dollars) per year more than their never-divorced counterparts. We show that this earnings advantage is due to greater labor supply intensity (weeks and hours of work) rather than higher labor force participation. We also show that the gap in labor supply intensity between ever-and never-divorced women is larger among women with older children.
Divorced women can also improve their economic situation by obtaining more non-labor income, welfare payments and custody transfers, or cohabitating or remarrying. We investigate this possibility by comparing non-woman income (total household income not generated by the woman) and non-wage income (a woman's total personal income minus her annual wages)
across ever-and never-divorced women. Again, simple cross-sectional comparisons indicate substantially lower non-woman and non-wage income for ever-divorced women, while our IV estimates do not allow us to distinguish between zero effects or small negative effects. We also find that some divorced women with young children move in with their parents; which increases their non-woman income and compensates for the loss of their husband's income.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 documents the relationship between the firstborn sex and marital dissolution. Section 4 characterizes the population of ever-divorced women and demonstrates the random assignment of firstborn sex. Section 5 analyzes the relationship between marital dissolution and economic status of women. Section 6 presents a sensitivity analysis. The last section concludes.
Data
The data for this study are drawn from the 1980 U.S. Census Public-Use Micro Samples. 5 The 1980 Census is well suited for an analysis of marital instability and the economic well-being of women because it contains information on marital history (number of marriages and age at first marriage) and indicators of economic status (poverty, income, and labor market outcomes) for a large and representative sample of women. In fact, the 1980 Census is the only large and nationally representative data set allowing this kind of analysis. The 1990 Census does not contain marital history information (only current marital status is reported), and while earlier
Censuses provide marital and fertility history information, the rate of marital dissolution was too low in the 1960s and 1970s to motivate an empirical investigation.
Throughout the analysis we use a sample of white women aged 21-40 who married at least once. We focus on white women because the high rate of out-of-wedlock births among black women renders a highly selected sample. 6 Table 1 reports summary statistics and illustrates the construction of the sample used in the analysis. The first column displays summary statistics for all white women aged 21-40, irrespective of marital and fertility history.
Columns 2 and 3 restrict the sample to ever-married women, and ever-married women with at least one child, respectively. 7 The entries in column 3 indicates that ever-married woman with at least one child have 2.2 children on average. By 1980, 26% of these women's first marriages had ended. 5 The data were accessed from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Version 2.0). Observations with allocated age, number of marriages, current marital status, age at first marriage, number of children ever-born, relationship to the household head and sex were excluded. Families are also excluded if the oldest child has allocated values for age, sex, relationship to the household head or month of birth. Widows are also excluded. None of the results are significantly altered by these exclusions. 6 See for example, Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) who report that in 1980-84, 57% of black births were out-ofwedlock compared to only 12% of white births. 7 Throughout we consider women whose first marriage began when they were 17-26 years of age. This includes 90% of all first marriages.
Because the Census does not identify children who have moved out of the household, we further limit the sample to women whose children all reside in her household. This restriction allows us to ascertain the sex of the oldest child. 8 Children are matched to mothers within households using the household relationship information in the Census. The summary statistics for this subsample of 558,808 mothers are reported in column 4 of Table 1 . For this subsample, 21% of first marriages ended in divorce. The lower incidence of marital instability among this group reflects the fact that they are less likely to have had their first child before their first marriage began, which makes their first marriage more likely to survive (Bronars and Grogger 1994) .
Column 5 further restricts the sample to women whose oldest child is under the age of eighteen, and whose children all live in her household. This requirement is important because youth are progressively more likely to move out of their parent's home as they age. Finally, the Census does not distinguish between biological, adopted and stepchildren. In an attempt to isolate biological children born during the first marriage, we limit the sample to women whose first child is born within the first five years of her first marriage. Combined, these restrictions allow us to identify the sex of the firstborn child within the first marriage. The summary statistics for this final sample of 465,595 women are reported in column 6. Except where noted otherwise, the empirical analysis in the remainder of the paper uses the sample described in column 6. For simplicity, we refer to this group as 'ever-married mothers'. The incidence of marital dissolution for this group is 20%. The similarity of the averages in columns (1)- (6) indicate that the sample of ever-married mothers is mostly representative of the population of white women aged 21-40. Nevertheless section 6 examines the sensitivity of our results to these restrictions.
There is no single widely accepted measure of "economic well-being". Reflecting this fact, we use five indicators corresponding to different components of economic well-being. We begin by analyzing equivalized household income (total household income divided by the poverty line 9 ) and poverty (=1 if the household's total income places them below the poverty line). These two indicators provide different information about distribution of economic wellbeing in the population: Equivalized household income is more informative about the average level of well-being, while the poverty rate is more informative about the lower tail of the distribution of well-being. We also consider non-woman income (total household income minus the total income of the woman), personal income (the woman's total income) and the woman's annual wage. Since the family unit is not always a well-defined concept following marital dissolution, due to cohabitation, we focus on household-based measures of income instead of the family-based measures reported in the Census.
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The average economic status of the women in our sample is reported in the bottom panel of Table 1 . The average level of household income among ever-married mothers is 312.5 times the poverty line. The poverty rate is 7% and average personal income is $9,437, which is almost entirely labor market earnings ($8,245) . Thus, non-labor sources of income such as welfare payments, child support and alimony do not appear to be important income sources for the population of ever-married mothers. On average, the largest income component is non-woman income at $40,185. Combined, these income levels imply an average household income of approximately $50,000. 9 We translate the family poverty cut-offs, based on the number of adults and children, to households. 10 All results are very similar using family measures and are available from the authors upon request.
The relationship between firstborn sex and marital dissolution
The fact that the sex composition of offspring, in families with at least 2 children, affects subsequent fertility is often interpreted as evidence of parental preference for mixed sex composition among their offspring (examples include Ben-Porath and Welch 1976 , Leung 1991 , and Angrist and Evans 1998 . Others have suggested that couples may have a preference for male firstborn child (Williamson 1976) . However, parental sex preferences may also influence marital stability. For example, some analysts have argued that marriages are less likely to survive the birth of daughters than sons (Morgan, Lye and Condran 1988 , Teachman and Schollaert 1989 , and Katzev, and Warner and Acock 1994 . Assuming that firstborn sex is random (evidence for this is provided below) and that there is a systematic relationship between divorce and the sex of the firstborn child, firstborn sex may provide an exogenous source of variation in the probability that a first marriage ends among families with at least one child. Table 2 investigates the relationship between firstborn sex and marital instability. We present several reduced-form estimates that confirm that firstborn girls increase the probability that the marriage ends in divorce. We also explore the potential sources of heterogeneity in the relationship between marital instability and firstborn sex. Columns 1 and 2 report the unadjusted differences and associated F-statistics testing the null hypothesis that firstborn sex has no effect on marital instability and columns 3 and 4 report the regression-adjusted differences and associated F-statistics. 11 Finally column 5 displays the number of observations. Panel A reports the overall effect of firstborn sex on the probability of marital disruption.
The point estimate is 0.008 (std error=0.001), indicating that in the population of ever-married mothers, a firstborn born girl increases the probability that the first marriage ends by 0.8
11 Unless noted otherwise all the models in this paper control for the following characteristics: quadratics in age, age at first marriage, age at first birth and education, unrestricted state of birth and residence dummies, a dummy for SMSA status and interactions between education and the other continuous explanatory variables.
percentage points. This translates into a 4% higher divorce rate for women with firstborn girls relative to firstborn boys given an average divorce rate of 20% for all first marriages. Adjusting for observable characteristics does not alter the estimated effect of a firstborn girl on marital disruption, as should be expected if firstborn sex is random. The large F-statistics (50.2 and 46.1 for the unadjusted and adjusted models, respectively) confirm the importance of firstborn child's sex on marital instability.
Panels B, C and D investigate the potential sources of heterogeneity in the relationship between marital instability and firstborn sex. In panel B we estimate the models separately by education level (dropout, high school graduate, some college and college graduate). While the effects are more pronounced for high school dropouts, firstborn sex significantly affects the probability of divorce for all education groups except college graduates (the adjusted F-statistics are respectively 18.1, 13.7, 15.9, and 3.4). Thus, the results reported in panel A are not driven by a single group of women, at least in terms of educational attainment.
Panel C allows for differential effects by mother's age at first marriage. In particular, we estimate the models separately if the mother married before or after age of 20. While the effect of first offspring sex on marital disruption is stronger for mothers who married at younger ages, the F-statistics indicate a significant relationship for both age groups. Panel D similarly allows for differential effects by age at first birth. We break the sample into women whose first birth occurred before or after her twenty-second birthday. Again, the contrasts are significant for both groups, but the effect of a firstborn girl is stronger among women who were younger when they had their first child.
Finally, we also note that this relationship is not specific to the 1980 Census. We also examined the effect firstborn sex on the incidence of marital instability using data from the 1960 and 1970 Censuses. The point estimates for 1960 and 1970 are 0.006 and 0.004, respectively, with standard errors of 0.002 and 0.001. These effects translate into 3-7% higher divorce rates for women with firstborn girls, relative to the average divorce rates for these years. An appendix containing these results is available from the authors upon request.
The random assignment of firstborn sex and characteristics of ever-divorced women
In the neoclassical theory of marriage (Becker 1973 (Becker , 1974 , marital gains are derived from specialization within the household and hence depend on the woman's potential earnings capacity relative to her husbands, which is determined by the marital matching process (Burdett and Coles 1997) . Therefore, the characteristics of husbands and wives whose marriage end will differ from the average characteristics of husbands and wives whose marriages continue. As a result, cross-sectional comparisons of labor market outcomes across never-and ever-divorced women may be confounded by omitted variables bias.
The left panel of Table 3 provides some evidence suggesting that marital disruption is affecting a nonrandom subset of the ever-married mother population. Columns 1 and 2 report the average marital history, fertility, and socioeconomic characteristics of never-and everdivorced women, respectively. Column 3 reports the mean differences and their associated standard errors. These entries provide clear evidence that marital instability is not randomly assigned. In particular, ever-divorced women were younger when they married for the first time,
were younger when their first child was born and are less educated. All differences reported in column 3 are statistically significant at the 5% level. These substantial differences highlight the need for a credible research design capable of addressing the differential selection into neverand ever-divorced groups.
In contrast to the important differences in the characteristics of women across divorce status, there is no evidence of systematic differences in the observable characteristics across women with firstborn girls and boys. This is evidenced in the right panel of Table 3 . Columns 4
and 5 report the average marital history, fertility, and socioeconomic characteristics of evermarried women with firstborn girls and boys, respectively, and column 6 reports the differences in means and their associated standard errors. None of the differences reported in column 6 are statistically significant at the conventional level. Moreover, the differences are all very small relative to the sample averages reported in the sixth column of Table 1 . This is exactly what should be expected if firstborn sex is randomly assigned in the population of ever-married mothers. Of particular importance, age at first marriage, age at first birth and education, three strong predictors of marital instability (as evidenced in column 3) are balanced on the basis of the firstborn sex. Overall, the results reported in the right panel of Table 3 support the claim that firstborn sex is randomly assigned within the population of ever-married mothers, at least in terms of observable characteristics. In the next sections, we use an instrumental variables strategy based on this fact to analyze the impact of divorce on the economic status of women.
The effect of marital dissolution on the economic status of women

A. OLS estimates
We begin the empirical analysis by using OLS regressions to estimate the relationship between women economic status and marital instability. 12 Let Y i denote a measure of economic status for woman i:
As previously stated, we focus on five indicators of economic status: equivalized household income, poverty, non-woman income, personal income and wages. In addition, we also analyze the labor supply determinants of annual wages, (i.e. employment, weeks worked last year and hours worked per week). The variable D i is a dummy variable indicating that the woman's first marriage dissolved, X i denotes observable characteristics, and ε i represents the unobservable determinants of economic status. The parameter of interest is β; the causal effect of marital instability on economic status. In all models, X i includes quadratics in age, age at first marriage, age at first birth and years of education, a dummy for SMSA status, unrestricted state of birth and state of residence dummies, as well as interactions between years of education and all the other continuous explanatory variables.
The first column in Table 4 reports the OLS estimates of β in equation (1). These estimates show the negative cross-sectional association between economic status and marital dissolution, as others have documented. All the effects in column 1 are very precisely estimated.
Equivalized household income is only 260 percent of the poverty line (compared to 313 percent on average) and the poverty rate is 12 percentage points higher for ever-divorced mothers.
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This is entirely explained by the large reduction in non-woman income following divorce. As column 1 shows, ever-divorced women have higher average levels of personal income than never-divorced mothers, a fact mostly attributable to their higher labor market earnings. As indicated by the last rows in column 1, the higher wages arise from the stronger labor market attachment of ever-divorced women. Taken together, these estimates are qualitatively similar to those in other studies (see for example Johnson and Skinner 1986 , Duncan and Hoffman 1985 and 1989 , Burkhauser et al. 1991 , and Smock et al. 1993 and 1999 .
13 Similar OLS and IV results are obtained when poverty is replaced by public assistance receipt.
B. TSLS estimates
While there is well-documented evidence of significant marital status effects in models of female economic status and labor supply, like in column 1 of Table 4 , the causal interpretation of these estimates in various contexts has been questioned in recent years (Korenman and Neumark 1992 , Smock, Manning and Gupta 1999 , and Krashinsky 2002 . In particular, the causal interpretation rests on the assumption that unobservables do not confound the marital status effect. This seems very unlikely. Table 3 clearly documents substantial differences in observable characteristics across never-and ever-divorced women. This suggests that the populations of never-and everdivorced women may also differ along unobservable dimensions, in particular, unobserved determinants of economic status and labor supply (Altonji, Elder and Taber 2000) . In other words, D i and ε i may be correlated in equation (1). In this case, the OLS estimates of β reported in Table 4 will be confounded by omitted variable bias.
We propose an instrumental variables solution to this problem using the sex of the firstborn child as an exogenous determinant of divorce. This identification strategy rests of the assumption that firstborn sex influences indicators of economic status like poverty and income only through its effect on marital stability, so that firstborn sex can be rightfully excluded from models like (1). Since firstborn sex is essentially random, as evidenced in Table 3 , this assumption appears reasonable. Moreover, as reported in Table 2 , firstborn sex is an important determinant of marital disruption with an F-statistic of 46.1. This approach may therefore be helpful in identifying the causal effect of divorce on economic status.
To exploit the randomness embodied in the sex of the firstborn child, we begin by using a single indicator for firstborn girls as an instrument for marital dissolution. More specifically, we estimate the parameters of equation (1) using TSLS based on the following the first-stage equation for divorce:
Estimates of π 1 have already been reported in Table 2. 14 Column 2 in Table 4 reports the TSLS (or "Wald") estimates of the effect of marital instability on the determinants of economic status when the control variables, X i , are excluded from the first-stage and outcome equations. Column 3 in Table 4 similarly reports the TSLS estimates when the control variables are included in the models. While the model in (1) is written as a homogeneous treatment effect model, the TSLS estimates in Table 4 can be interpreted as the LATE specific to the instrument firstborn sex Angrist 1994, and Angrist and Imbens 1995) . Under this interpretation the TSLS estimate of β is the average treatment effect in the population of mothers whose marital status is changed by the sex of their firstborn child.
The entries in columns 2 and 3 point to two main findings: Firstly, to the extent that economic status is adequately measured by equivalized household income, there is no evidence of a negative impact of divorce on economic status. Secondly, the higher levels of personal income and wages for ever-divorced women are attributable to greater labor supply intensity rather than labor market participation. These conclusions are supported by two sets of results.
To begin with, the TSLS estimates indicate that equivalized household income is higher for ever-divorced women. In all cases, these results are both statistically significant at the conventional level and the Hausman tests reject the null hypothesis that the TSLS and OLS estimates are the same (except for sampling errors) at the 5% level. At the same time, the TSLS estimates indicate that personal income and annual wages are $13,042 and $11,378 higher on 14 All reduced-form estimates are reported in an appendix and are available from the authors upon request.
average among ever-divorced women (both differences are statistically significant at the 5% level). However, the evidence on poverty and non-woman income is weaker: For both outcomes, the TSLS estimates are not significantly different from 0 and the Hausman statistics are small.
Second, the higher wages of ever-divorced women are mostly attributable to greater labor supply intensity. The TSLS estimates in column 3 reveal that the average ever-divorced woman works 24 more weeks per year than the average never-divorced women, and that this difference is statistically significant at the conventional level. The corresponding OLS estimate is 2.5 times smaller. However, the TSLS estimates for the probability of employment and hours worked per week are insignificant at the conventional level. In both cases, the IV estimates cannot distinguish between the null of zero effect or the OLS estimates reported in column 1 (those are 0.188 (employment rate) and 9.663 (hours per week)).
The last column of Table 4 adds total fertility and current marital status (=1 if the first marriage ended and the respondent is currently married) to the set of control variables.
Controlling for total fertility alone does not alter the TSLS estimates reported in Table 4 . This finding is consistent with the evidence in Table 2 , which shows that sex of the firstborn is orthogonal to total fertility, as Angrist and Evans (1998) also found. Controlling for the current marital status of ever-divorced women is more problematic since there is non-random selection into remarriage. 15 Thus the balancing property of firstborn sex documented in Table 3 is lost once we condition on current marital status of ever-divorced women. Consequently, the TSLS estimates reported in column 4 should be interpreted with caution. Adding a control for the current marital status of ever-divorced women raises the estimated effect of marital dissolution on all outcomes considered in Table 4 , although not significantly. The higher point estimates are largely driven by a weaker first stage relationship between firstborn girls and marital disruption once remarriage is controlled for. The coefficient on firstborn sex falls from 0.008 to 0.004.
C. Allowing the effects to vary by firstborn age
The effect of marital dissolution on the economic welfare of mothers may depend on the age of their firstborn for several reasons. 16 First, independent of parental sex preferences, firstborn sex cannot have an immediate effect on the probability of divorce. Second, strong labor market attachment is more costly and difficult among divorced mothers with young children (relative those with older children). Finally, since husband's income grows over time (because of the increasing age-earnings profile) the decline in non-women income following divorce will increase with the age of firstborn, since parents with older children tend to be older themselves.
At the same time, divorced women with younger children may be more likely to move in with their own parents following a divorce, which could alleviate the loss of husband's income.
We explore these possibilities in Table 5 by estimating the models on samples of women whose firstborn is younger or older than 12 years old. For comparison, column 1 reports the results from the full sample (column 3 in Table 4 ). The OLS estimates reported in the top panel of Table 5 confirm the finding of a negative cross-sectional association between marital disruption and economic status for women illustrated in Table 4 . The point estimates in columns 2 and 3 are remarkably similar to those in column 1. Thus the OLS results appear largely independent of firstborn age. 16 We elected to condition on firstborn age because women with firstborn of the same age have been at risk of marital instability (at least the part caused by firstborn sex) for the same period of time. Stratifying the analysis by woman's age would tend to confound this kind of effect. Nevertheless, there is a strong correlation between mother's age and firstborn age.
In the bottom panel of Table 5 we report TSLS following the same specification as column 3 in Table 4 . For the two samples we also report the F-statistics from the first-stage relationship between marital dissolution and firstborn sex. In both cases the F-statistics are large (18.9 and 29.7 respectively), with the strongest effect in the group of women whose firstborn are aged 12 and older. While sometimes imprecise, the TSLS estimates in columns 2 and 3 indicate that economic consequences of marital instability depend to an important extent on the age of the oldest child.
First, we note that the positive TSLS effect of divorce on personal income and wages reported in Table 4 is concentrated in the group of women whose oldest child is at least 12. The personal income and wage differentials are $22,931 and $19,387 respectively, and are precisely estimated. Among women with younger firstborn children the TSLS estimates on personal income and wages are small and not statistically significant. This reflects the fact that the labor supply intensity of divorced mothers increases with firstborn age, relative to never-divorced mothers: The estimated effects on weeks worked and hours worked per week are 38.4 and 22.6, respectively (standard errors=11.1 and 8.3).
Next we turn to non-woman income. Again, the TSLS estimates differ greatly in the two subsamples, defined by the age of the oldest child. The estimated TSLS differences across divorce status are $26,982 in the group with young children and -$19,491 in the group with older children. Both point estimates are relatively imprecise, and must be interpreted accordingly.
Nevertheless, the sign reversal can be accounted for by the entries reported in the last two rows of Table 5 . There we report the fraction of ever-divorced mothers who reside with their parents, and the proportion who have remarried. The negative relationship in the TSLS estimates between non-women income and age of the oldest child can be explained by two phenomena.
First, divorced mothers with young child are more likely to relocate with their parents (by 5.6 percentage points), as shown in the last row of Table 5 . Since this group of women is relatively young, it is plausible that the parents of divorced mothers have higher earnings than the husbands of mothers who have remain married, which would tend to increase non-women income among divorced mothers. Second, among mothers with older children the negative TSLS estimate on non-women income can be attributed to the increasing age-earnings profile of husband of neverdivorced women, which makes the costs of divorce higher in terms of non-women income. Also the proportion of divorced mothers living with their parents is smaller in that group. Moreover, since the fraction of divorced mothers who remarry is similar in columns 2 and 3, this fact alone cannot explain why the sign on non-women income goes from positive to negative. The TSLS results for equivalized household income support the non-woman income results. We find that the positive causal impact found for the entire sample (column 1), is mostly attributable to women with young children.
Taken as a whole, the evidence in Table 5 reveals the mechanisms through which divorce affects the economic status of women. On the one hand, divorced women with young children may relocate with their parents, thereby maintaining or improving their pre-divorce economic position. On the other hand, divorced women with older children have higher labor market earnings than their never-divorced counterparts.
Sample selection issues
So far the analysis has been based on a sample of ever-married mothers whose children all reside in her household. This restriction is dictated by the fact the Census does not identify children who move out of the household. Children may move out of their mother's household following the breakup of a family, or for other reasons (mortality, college attendance, foster homes, etc).
This introduces a missing-data problem: the characteristics of children who reside outside of the mother's household are not observed. This missing data problem is troublesome if the probability that a child does not reside in their mother's household is partly determined by their sex. For example, if boys are less likely than girls to live with their mother after a divorce has occurred, our results may be biased in favor of finding that women with firstborn girls are more likely to experience divorce.
We address this issue in two ways. First, we examined the patterns of living arrangements for children from disrupted families using data from the 1980, 1985 and 1990 June CPS. 17 The June CPS contains complete marital and fertility history information. In particular, information on the living arrangements of all children of a mother is available. Of all firstborn children under the age of eighteen from divorced families 87% live with their mother, 8% live with their father, and 5% live with neither their mother nor father. Most importantly for our purposes, there is little difference in the sex composition of firstborn children from divorced families living outside of their mother's household: Conditional on residing outside of the mother's household, 48% of firstborn children are girls compared to 49% in the population at large (i.e. independent of parental marital status or living arrangements). Firstborn girls are therefore over-represented by approximately 1-percentage point in our sample of ever-divorced mothers.
While it is unclear whether such a small difference could systematically bias our estimates, we nonetheless explore the impact of reintroducing the excluded part of the sample (column 3 in Table 1 ) by randomly assigning the sex of the firstborn child for the households where that variable cannot be defined because of the structure of the Census. This reintroduces the sample of women whose first birth was before their first marriage, and whose first birth was outside the first 5 years of the first marriage. It also includes women whose oldest child is over the age of 17 and whose children do not all live in her household. In total, this adds an additional 196,626 women to the sample.
For these 196,626 women we randomly impute undefined firstborn sex in a variety of ways. First, we simply assign 49% of women with missing firstborn child sex information firstborn girls and 51% of these women firstborn boys; these proportions match the sample averages in the Census. To check the sensitivity of the results to this choice, we also do similar imputations with 48, 47 and 46% firstborn girls. The results of the sensitivity analysis yields TSLS estimates similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 5 . Thus the conclusions of Tables 4   and 5 are not specific to our baseline sample. 
Conclusion
The connection between marital instability and the economic well-being of women and children is a topic of great importance to social scientists and policymakers alike. Despite the significance of this question for many practical and theoretical debates, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding the cause-to-effect relationship between marital instability and the economic status of women. This uncertainty reflects the difficult task of identifying the causal relationship: The same factors that contribute to increasing the probability of divorce may also be detrimental to the economic well-being of women.
In this paper we present evidence based on an instrumental variable strategy. Our IV estimates are derived using firstborn sex as an exogenous determinant of marital instability in the population of ever-married women with at least one child. This instrument exploits the fact that marriages are less likely to survive following the birth of girls as opposed to boys. In the sample we consider, families with firstborn girls are 4% more likely to experience marital dissolution than families with firstborn boys. Since firstborn sex is essentially random, as evidenced in this paper, this approach may be helpful in untangling the "true" economic consequences of marital dissolution from the confounding effect of non-random selection of women into divorce.
Our OLS estimates of the economic consequences of marital dissolution are consistent with the previous literature in that they indicate substantial economic disadvantage for divorced women. In particular, divorce is associated with higher poverty rates, lower equivalized household income and lower non-woman income (total household income not generated by the woman). Similar findings have previously been interpreted by some analysts as indicating that marital status is an important causal determinant economic well-being for women. However, the evidence from our IV models brings this conclusion into question. Firstly, once the negative selection of women into divorce is accounted for, ever-divorced mothers have substantially higher levels of personal income and annual wages than never-divorced mothers. These effects are precisely estimated. We also show that this advantage is concentrated among mothers with older children. The better labor market performance of divorced women is an important factor in improving their economic position. Further, our IV estimates point to higher equivalized household income for ever-divorced women. This result is partly explained by the fact that divorced mothers with young children tend to relocate with their parents, thereby raising their standard of living. As such, our IV evidence for equivalized household income is not consistent with the contention that marital dissolution causes large declines in economic status. Tempering these results, our estimates for poverty incidence are always too imprecise to make conclusive statements about the cause-to-effect relationship between marital instability and poverty.
Together these results cast doubt on the contention that divorce necessarily causes a reduction in the economic status of women.
Finally, we show that the higher labor market earnings of divorced women are almost entirely attributable to increased labor supply intensity, relative to continuously married women.
Our IV estimates indicate that divorce is associated with more hours and weeks worked, and thus higher labor market earnings. At the same time, we find little difference in the employment rates of ever-divorced and never-divorced women. This evidence leads us to conclude that marital dissolution affects labor supply intensity but not the decision to participate in the labor market. The sample is defined as in column 6 in Table 1 . The models in (3) and (4) include quadratics in age, age at 1st marriage, age at 1st birth and years of education, interactions between education, age, age at 1st marriage and age at 1st birth, as well as unrestricted dummies for state of birth, state of residence and residence in a SMSA. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(1) The sample is defined as in column 6 in Table 1 . The standard deviations are reported in parentheses except in columns 3 and 6 the entries in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
(1) The baseline sample includes all women who are currently aged 21-40. Ever-married is defined as the first marriage beginning when the respondent was 17-26 years old. The samples are constructed following as in column 6 of The sample is defined as in column 6 in Table 1 . All models include quadratics in age, age at 1st marriage, age at 1st birth and years of education, interactions between education, age, age at 1st marriage and age at 1st birth as well as unrestricted dummies for state of birth, state of residence and residence in a SMSA. Heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors are reported in parentheses. G stands for firstborn girl. G is randomly assigned for all missing firstborn child genders using the percentage listed in the column header. 
